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MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF NATURAL
LAW: WILLIAM OF OCKHAM AND
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
VOLUNTARIST TRADITION
Francis Oakley
THE BELIEF in a natural law superior to mere positive enactment and the
practice of appealing to it were common to the vast majority of medieval
political thinkers'-whether civil lawyers or philosophers, canon lawyers or
theologians; and, all too often, it has been assumed that when they invoked
the natural law, they meant much the same thing by it. It takes, indeed, little
more than a superficial glance to discover that the civil or canon lawyers
often meant by natural law something rather different than did the philoso-
phers or theologians, but it takes perhaps a closer look to detect that not
even the theologians themselves were in full agreement in their theories of
natural law.
Now if, for the sake of simplicity, we ignore the canon and civil lawyers,
and set aside, therefore, the ambiguities and uncertainties which persisted in
their thinking about natural law, and if, having done this, we turn our at-
tention to the theologians of the later Middle Ages, we will find, I believe,
that their natural law theorizing was almost wholly trapped within the field
of attraction exercised by the two influential poles of the "rationalist" and
"voluntarist," or, if you wish, the "realist" and "nominalist" positions--this
latter terminology referring to the respective solutions of the two schools to
the basic epistemological problem of the status of universal concepts.
The most prominent of the medieval realists was, of course, Thomas
Aquinas, and the most coherent of the later medieval nominalists was William
of Ockham, the fourteenth century English philosopher of empiricist leanings
who has sometimes been compared with Hume. Neither of these men wrote
treatises specifically devoted to law, and their views, therefore, have to be
quarried from their general philosophical and polemical writings. This is
easy enough in the case of Aquinas, both because he was a systematic thinker
and because his views are so well known; but it is less easy when we turn to
Ockham, who produced no ordered synthesis comparable with the Summa
1. Marsilius of Padua is, of course, an exception to this generalization, though there is
some disagreement about the precise nature of his position-see ALAN GEWIRTH, 1
MARSILIUS OF PADUA 134-135 (New York, 1951).
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Theologica, and many of whose writings are not yet available in modem
editions. He was a most prolific writer. His remarks on law are scattered
throughout his writings, and few, indeed, are the scholars who can claim to
know them all. Moreover, in his best-known text on natural law,2 Ockham
actually distinguishes three varieties, the last of which overlaps with the
law of nations. The remarks which follow, however, will be restricted to
his first variety-natural law in what is for him its primary and fundamental
sense-and they will, therefore, reflect a somewhat simplified version of his
position.
These qualifications being understood, I propose to do four things: First,
to contrast the natural law theories of Aquinas and Ockham; second, to
trace the descendants of the Ockhamist theory; third, to ask whether this
particular theory of natural law entailed a definition of the nature of law
in general, and to inquire whether it is valid to suggest the existence of any
link between this theory of natural law and the development of the idea of
sovereignty; finally, and more tentatively, to contrast in general terms the
philosophical presuppositions relevant to the disparate legal theories of the
two men.
I
We may take as our point of departure one of Otto von Gierke's lengthy
footnotes in which he contrasts the two basic medieval views on natural law.
'The older view," he says,3
which is more especially that of the Realists, explained the Lex Naturalis
as an intellectual act independent of will-as a mere lex indicativa, in
which God was not lawgiver but a teacher working by means of Reason
-in short, as the dictate of Reason as to what is right, grounded in the
Being of God but unalterable even by Him.... The opposite proposition,
proceeding from pure Nominalism, saw in the Law of Nature a mere
divine command, which was right and binding merely because God was
the lawgiver. So Ockham, Gerson, 4 d'Ailly. 5
Gierke proffered no documentation of his assertion concerning the Nominal-
2. Cf. Dialogus, III, IT, III, ch. 6; in GOLDAST, 2 MONARcEHiA 934-935 (Frankfurt, 1668).
3. POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AOE 173, n. 256, transl. Maitland (Cambridge,
1927).
4. Jean le Charlier de Gerson (1363-1429), a sometime Chancellor of the University of
Paris, best known for his theological writings. For a brief biographical sketch see DICTION-
NAmnE DE THkOLOOIE CATHOLIQUE, s.V. "Gerson, Jean."
5. Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly (1350-1420), master and friend of Gerson, philosopher, theo-
logian, Chancellor of the University of Paris and, finally, Bishop of Cambrai. See DICT. DR
TakoL. CATH. S.V. "Ailly, Pierre d'."
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ists, but his interpretation of the Realist view can speedily be vindicated if
we turn to Aquinas's Summa Theologica.8
Law, according to Aquinas, is "something pertaining to reason" (aliquid
rationis) A And as the law is "nothing else than a dictate of practical reason
emanating from the ruler who governs a complete community," it follows,
if it is granted that the world is ruled by the divine providence, that
the whole community of the universe is governed by the divine reason.
And, therefore, the reason directing the government of things, existing
in God as ruler of the universe, has itself the nature of law. And because
the divine reason conceives no ideas in time ... it follows that this sort
of law must be called eternal.8
Or again, God is related to the world of which He is the creator and ruler,
as an artist is related to his work. And as in the mind of every artist there
pre-exists the idea of the work he produces, so also in every ruler there
pre-exists the idea of the order to be followed by those being governed. Hence
"the idea of the divine wisdom, moving all things to their due end, has the
nature of law," and "the eternal law is nothing other than the idea of the
divine wisdom insofar as it directs all acts and movements." Moreover,
Because all things which are subject to divine Providence are measured
and regulated by the Eternal Law, ... it is manifest that all things, in
some manner, participate in the Eternal Law, inasmuch as they derive
from it certain inclinations to those actions and aims which are proper
to them. Of all creatures, however, rational creatures are subject to
divine Providence in a more excellent way, being themselves made par-
ticipators in Providence itself, in that they control their own actions and
the actions of others. They have, therefore, a certain share in the divine
reason itself, from which they derive a natural inclination to such actions
and ends as are fitting. And this participation in the Eternal Law by
rational creatures is called the Natural Law.10
Aquinas's position, therefore, amounts basically to this: that there is an
Eternal Law which orders to their appointed ends all created things, irrational
as well as rational. Insofar as it concerns man and is apprehended by his
reason this eternal law is called the natural law. And it should be noted that
to these two categories he adds two further ones: divine positive law, the
6. SUMMA THEOLOOICA, la 2m, qu. 90-95. (The Summa is hereafter cited as S.T.)
7. S.T., Ia 2ae, qu. 91, art. 1.
8. S.T., Ia 2m, qu. 91, art. 1, Resp.
9. S.T., Ia 2a, qu. 93, art. 1, Resp.
10. S.T., Ia. 2z, qu. 91, art. 2, Resp.
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decrees of God which supplement the natural law and which are made known
to man by revelation rather than reason; 1 1 and human positive law, the
laws enacted by rulers for their subjects.' 2 Finally, he maintains, every human
positive law "bears the nature of law only insofar as it is derived from the
natural law."' 3
If, however, we now turn to Ockham we will find, according to Gierke,
that far from viewing the natural law as grounded in the Being of God, he
regarded it merely as a series of divine commands. But Gierke supports his
interpretation with no references, and it has not gone unchallenged. In 1932
Max A. Shephard, in an article1 4 commended in recent years by Ewart
Lewis, 15 took issue with it, and his arguments have led Sabine to conclude
that "there is a question how far William actually carried his metaphysics
over into his theory of law."' 1 6 Referring to a passage from the first part of
Ockham's Dialogus,17 in which he speaks of "natural law or evident natural
reason," Shephard contended that such a linking together of the natural
law and natural reason "shows us that Occam held to the time-honored
ancient and medieval tradition of eternal, immutable principles of nature,
discoverable by the use of reason." He concluded, therefore, that
no really essential difference exists between Occam and Aquinas on this
point, and that it is on the whole erroneous to extend the nominalistic-
realistic schism to embrace their respective theories of natural law.
It is true that such texts, in which Ockham links natural law with evident
natural reason, are broadcast throughout the Dialogus, and in one of them,
indeed, Ockham gives an unquestionable indication of the rational character
of natural law, when he speaks of "using the natural dictate of reason, that
is, using natural law."1 8 Other texts fail, however, to support this position.
For in at least two places in the Dialogus,19 Ockham says that certain moral
11. S.T., la 2w, qu. 91, art. 4, Resp.
12. S.T., la 2w, qu. 95, art. 1, Resp.
13. S.T., la 2w, qu. 95, art. 2, Resp.
14. William of Occam and the Higher Law, 26 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
1005-23 (1932); also vol. 27 (1933), pp. 24-38. The quotations below arc from p. 1009.
15. 1 MEDIEVAL POLITICAL IDEAS 336, n. 32 (London, 1954).
16. G. H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 306 (New York, 1955).
17. The DIALOGUS, a rather prolix polemical work, takes the form of a discussion between
a master and his pupil, Ockham representing the master whom the pupil questions on his
opinions. (This work is hereafter cited as DIAL.)
18. DIAL. I, VI, ch. 100, p. 629, line 45, "utens naturali dictamine rationis, hoc est
utens jure naturali."
19. DIAL. I, I, ch. 8, p. 405, line 9, "Quacdam vero pure moralia traduntur in eis, quac
nulla possunt ratione muniri, sicut patet in multis capitulis decretorum et decretalium."
DIAL. I, I, ch. 8, p. 405, lines 20-21, "Quantum vero ad moralia, quae nulla possunt
ratione muniri .... "
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precepts cannot be defended by reason. Indeed, he goes so far as to admit
that God is not bound by natural law because He can dispense from its pre-
cepts.20 Such statements can only serve to indicate that the natural law,
far from possessing any intrinsic rationality or any ontological foundation, is
grounded solely in the decisions of a sovereign Divinity. Faced with these
contradictions, therefore, it becomes necessary to broaden the basis of our
inquiry and to see what Ockham had to say about the question in his Com-
mentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard21 -an earlier writing and his
major philosophical work.
Here Gierke would seem to find support in a long series of texts which
enunciate the voluntarist position in terms which admit of no equivocation.
In the second book of the Sentences we are told that hate of God, adultery,
robbery-all such vices--could be stripped of their evil and rendered meri-
torious "if they were to agree with the divine precept just as now, de facto,
their opposites agree with the divine precept." 22 The reason for this is that
"God is obliged to the causing of no act." 23 And, indeed, all this is but a
necessary deduction from the position already adopted by Ockham when he
said that "evil is nothing other than the doing of something opposite to that
which one is obliged to do."'24 It should be noted, too, that such an obliga-
tion does not affect God, since He is not obliged to do anything.
So far, so good. But in the third book of the Sentences we are told that
20. DiA.. III, I, II, ch. 24, p. 812, lines 35-36, "Si autem .int simpliciter prncepta juris
naturalis, nullus casus excipi debet, propter quamcunque necessitatem vel utilitatem, nisi
Deus specialiter aliquem exciperet."
21. SUPER QUATUOR Lnaos SENTENTIARUM (Lyons, 1495)-to be cited hereafter as
SENT. This is one of the many medieval commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,
born c. 1100, died c. 1160: first, Professor of Theology at Paris, later, Bishop of Paris.
Lombard's Sentences consists of a long series of questions in which the whole body of
theological doctrine is covered and united in a systematized whole. Down to the sixteenth
century, it was the textbook of the university course and upon it every future doctor had
to lecture.
22. SENT. II, qu. 19 0: "... dico quod licet odium dei, furari, adulterari habeant
malam circumstantiam annexam et similia de communi lege quatenus fiunt ab aliquo qui
ex prcepto d ivino obligatur ad contrarium: sed quantum ad esse absolutum in illis
actibus possunt fieri a deo sine omni circumstantia mala annexa: et etiam meritorie possunt
fieri a viatore si caderent sub pmncepto divino sicut nunc de facto eorum opposita cadunt
sub prmcepto divino."
23. SENT. II, qu. 19 P: "... sed deus ad nullum actum causandum obligatur: ideo
quemlibet actum absolutum potest sine omni malo culpat causare: et ejus oppositum, et
ideo sicut potest causare totaliter actum diligendi sine bonitate vel malicia morali: Quia
bonitas moralis et malicia connotant quod agens obligatur ad illum actum vel ejus
oppositum: ita potest totaliter causare actum odiendi deum sine omni malicia morali
propter eamdem causam: quia ad nullum actum causandum obligatur."
24. SENT. II, qu. 5 H: ". . . quia malum nihil aliud est quam facere aliquid ad cujus
oppositum faciendum aliquis obligatur: qum obligatio non cadit in deum: quia ie ad
nihil faciendum obligatur, nec pr-supponitur malicia in causa: qux sit causa malicis
effectus. Sed malicia effectus est causa malici- in causa."
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"no act is perfectly virtuous unless the will through that act wishes that which
is dictated by right reason because it is dictated by right reason." 25 Again,
therefore, a coherent position seems to be shattered by the introduction of
an alien element incompatible with it. Again, as was the case with his political
writings, so also with his more purely philosophical, it seems impossible to
extract from them a coherent interpretation of the nature of morality and
hence a clear doctrine of natural law. In both we find, in intimate juxta-
position, the rationalist and voluntarist theories, and no peace can be found
to grow between these antinomies. For it is clear that there can be no
question of a compromise.
It would, nevertheless, be incorrect to accuse Ockham either of inco-
herence or illogicality. For if we push the analysis another step further, we
do not, it is true, find suitable ground for a compromise, for that is out of
the question, but we do find that the last word lies with the will. Will, not
reason, is found to be at the heart of law. Coming, as it does, after the ra-
tionalist texts quoted above, this, no doubt, must seem a rash contention.
The fact is, however, that there is, in itself, nothing final about right reason;
the ultimate priority lies with the divine will, for it is rather "by the very
fact that the divine will wishes it that right reason dictates what is to be
willed."'28 Again, no act elicited against right reason, we are told, can be
virtuous, "Since such an act would be elicited against divine precept and
against the divine will commanding that such an act be elicited in conformity
with right reason."127 We are now at the very heart of Ockham's position.
And there is no dichotomy between the respective criteria of right reason and
divine will, which are linked here, and linked significantly and hierarchically.
The case, therefore, for the voluntarist interpretation of morality, and,
as a result, of natural law, would now seem to be watertight. But it is still
possible to feel a certain dissatisfaction with the logic of Ockham's argumen-
tation. It may be true for him, as we have seen, that right reason is depend-
ent, for the very role it plays in morality, upon the will of God, but he had
not only based natural law on right reason - he had also asserted that the
25. SENT. III, qu. 12 CCM: ". . . nullus actus est perfecte virtuosus nisi voluntas per
illum actum velit dictatum a recta ratione propter hoc quod est dictatus a recta ratione."
26. SENT. I, dist. xli, qu. 1 K: ". . . onmis voluntas recta est conformis rationi rectm
sed non est semper conformis rationi recta provige qu- ostendat causam quare voluntas
debet hoc velle. Sed eo ipso quod voluntas divina hoc vult, ratio recta dictat quod est
volendum."
27. SENT. III, 13 C: "runc arguo sic. Impossible est quod aliquis actus voluntatis
elicitus contra conscientiam et contra dictamen rationis sive rectum sive erroneum sit
virtuosus. Patet de conscientia recta: quia talis eliceretur contra pr-eceptum divinum et
voluntatem divinam volentem talem actum elicere conformiter rationi recta."
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natural law is absolute, 28 immutable, and admitting of no dispensation.2 9
And does not natural law, so defined, burst through the voluntarist frame-
work that is damped, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, upon it? For it is diffi-
cult to conceive of a moral order as absolute, immutable, and without dispen-
sation, when it is completely dependent upon the will of a divine sovereign.
Once again, however, the inconsistencies are but superficial. For Ock-
ham distinguishes between the ordained or ordinary power of God, by which
God has actually established a moral order (within the framework of which
established economy the moral law is absolute, immutable, and without dis-
pensation), and the absolute power of God, whereby God could order the
opposites of the acts which He has, in fact, forbidden. 30 This teaching is not
as complex as might at first appear to be. Ockham is merely applying to the
realm of ethics a distinction which he regards as relevant to all operations
of the divine will. What he is in fact assuming is this: that God's absolute
power, subject though it can be to no limitation, normally expresses itself,
nevertheless, in accordance with the supernatural or natural order which
has been ordained. Thus, as Christians, we must believe that God guaran-
tees to fulfill the divine promises contained in the Scriptures, and, even as
philosophers we can safely assume that the order apparent in nature betrays
certain constant rules according to which God will normally act. The big
reservation assumed in this, and underlined by the use of such qualifications
as "by the common law" or "in the present order," is that God, of His
absolute freedom and power, could always abrogate the present economy,
or transcend it, as He does in the case of miracles.
Experience teaches us, for example, that water dampens, fire burns, and
so on; nevertheless, by the absolute power of God, these effects need not
necessarily proceed from their causes - think, for example, of the case of
Daniel's three companions, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, whom King
Nebuchadnezzar threw into the fiery furnace but who emerged unscathed. 3'
Similarly, although we normally assume that it is good to love God and bad
to hate Him, nevertheless God could, of His absolute power, make it meri-
torious to hate Him, since acts are good and just, or bad and unjust, not of
28. DIAL. III, II, I, ch. 10, p. 878, lines 27-31, "Cum jus naturale sit naturale prmceptum
... prtceptum autem naturale quoddam est absolutum absque omni conditione, modifica-
tione seu determinatione, sicut 'Non coles deum alienum,' 'non mzchaberis,' et hujusmodi."
29. DLAL. III, II, III, ch. 6, p. 932, line 65, .... .quia jus naturale eat immutabile primo
modo et invariabile ac indispensabile."
30. Opus NONAGINTA DI=Rum ch. 95 (no foliation) (Lyons: Jean Trechsel, 1495).
See esp. § Nota de duplici potentia dei.
31. Id. at § Hereticum est dicere omnia de necessitate evenire.
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their own nature or essence, but simply because God has enjoined or forbid-
den them.3 2 Thus when Ockham speaks of a natural law which is absolute,
immutable, and admitting of no dispensation, he is thinking within the frame-
work of the ordained or ordinary power of God. Thus it is that he can tell
us that "in the present order, no act is perfectly virtuous unless elicited in
conformity with right reason," 33 and can speak of an act of will which is
"intrinsically and necessarily virtuous, given the divine order." 34 Indeed,
his very use of qualifications like in the present order and given the divine
order is significant.
II
Our conclusion, therefore, can only be this: that Gierke, after all, was
right to brand Ockham as a legal voluntarist, and that Shephard's criticism
fails to do justice either to the profundity of Gierke's scholarship or to the
consistency and rigor of Ockham's thinking. Nor was this way of thinking
without subseque.: adherents. The history of the voluntarist interpretation
of natural law has yet to be written, and it forms something of a subterranean
stream in late-medieval and modern thought. This much, however, is ap-
parent: that having been formulated with clarity by Ockham, it was propa-
gated by his philosophical descendants, the nominalist philosophers who be-
came so prominent in the later Middle Ages. Notable among these were
Gerson and d'Ailly, of whom we have already heard,35 and whose works
were widely read in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. And to their names
may be added those of Gabriel Biel (d. 1495), Jacob Almain (d. 1515),
John Major (d. 1540), and Alphonse de Castro (d. 1558) -all of whom
were cited in 1612 as proponents of the voluntarist theory by the Jesuit phi-
losopher Suarez, whose own theory, indeed, bore the impress of this point of
view.36
Nor was this way of thinking limited to those whom we usually regard
as scholastic philosophers. Luther was well acquainted with the writings
of several of these men; and through him the voluntarist theory, complete
with the characteristic distinction between the absolute and the ordinary
32. Cf. op. cit. supra notes 22 and 24.
33. SENT. III, 12 CCC, ". . . stante ordinatione qum nunc est nullus actus est perfecte
virtuosus nisi conformiter eliciatur rationi recta actualiter inhxrenti.
34. SENT. III, 12 CCC, ". . . aliquis actus voluntatis qui est intrinsece et necessario
virtuosus stante ordinatio divina."
35. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
36. "De Legibus, ac Deo Legislatore," Bk. 1, ch. 5, 8-9; 1 SELECTIONS FROM THREE
WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J. 26 (Oxford, 1944).
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powers of God, seems to have made its way into Protestant theology37 --
Calvin, for example, being notably unambiguous on this point.3S The per-
sistence into the seventeenth century of this interpretation of natural law is
manifest in Suarez's Treatise on Laws,39 and Suarez was by no means alone.
Earlier in the same century, Grotius (who was later to change his mind)
had adopted a similar position in his Commentary concerning the Law of
Booty40 and Locke's early essays on the natural law - published for the first
time in 1954 - reveal that he, too, at least in his early years, had voluntarist
inclinations. 41 A few years later, Hobbes42 and Pufendorf43 were to conceive
of natural law in similar terms, but the ultimate fate of the tradition is ob-
scured partly by the growing lack of interest in the divine origin of the natural
law, and even more by the characteristic imprecision of eighteenth century
thinking on the subject - though, if we were to look, we would find Black-
stone, over a century later, speaking of the natural law which governs man
as "the will of his maker." 44
III
We have been speaking, so far, about the nature of natural law. At this
stage, however, we must face a question of a more practical character. Grant-
ed that Ockham, instead of regarding the natural law "as the dictate of
reason as to what is right, grounded in the Being of God, but unalterable
even by Him," reduced all moral laws to inscrutable divine commands, "right
and binding merely because God was the lawgiver" - granted all this, is not
the outcome, in practice, the same? Ockham remained, after all, a firm
believer in the natural law, and it has been said that, with regard to insist-
ence upon the law and dislike of arbitrary power, the principles of Ockham
37. 43 D. MARTIN LUTHERS WERKE 71 (Weimar, 1912), 'Vorlesungen fiber I Mose,'
Kap. 19, 14; cf. also, Kap. 19, 17-20 and Kap. 20, 2.
The voluntarist character of Zwingli's view of natural law has been pointed out by
John T. McNeill, Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers, 26 THE JOURNAL OF
RELIGION 177-178 (1946); and Georges de Lagarde sees in the juridical thought of the
reformers in general, a reiteration of the nominalist idea of law-REHERCHES SUR
L'ESPRIT POLITIQ14E DE LA RiFORME 166-167 (Douai, 1926).
38. JOHANNIS CALVINI INSTITUTIO CHRISTLNAE RELIOIONIS (Berlin, 1846), p. 486;
Lib. IV, ch. 20, § 16.
39. Bk. II, ch. 6, 20-23; 1 SELECTIONS 126-128.
40. DE JURE PRAEDAE, COMMENTARIUS, ed. H. G. Hamaker (The Hague, 1868), ch. 2,
pp. 7-8. This work was written in the winter of 1604-5, but rediscovered only in 1864 and
first published in 1868. In his later and more famous De lure Belli et Pacis, Grotius
abandoned this position in favor of an extremely rationalistic interpretation-see the
edition of William Whewell (Cambridge, 1853), Bk. I, ch. 1, X, 1-2, pp. 10-11.
41. W. VAN LEYDEN (ed.), JOHN LOCKE: ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE (Oxford,
1954).
42. LEVIATHAN, Part II, ch. 30-31, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford, 1946), pp. 219-235.
43. See his DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUm, Lib. I, c. 3, § XX (London, 1672), p. 191.
44. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (New York, 1830), p. 26; Sect. I, 40.
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do not differ materially from those of Aquinas. Have we, perhaps, made too
much of the changes wrought by Ockham?
The answer to this question can only be a firm negative. Jerome Hall
has recently suggested that the voluntarist phase of natural law thinking
actually encouraged legal positivism in its definition of law as the command
of the sovereign, and has claimed that "an examination of certain natural
law writing is illuminating as regards the source of some of the basic legal
ideas which are usually assumed to be the invention of the positivists." 45
Hall does not, it is true, fully document his assertions, but there can be little
doubt that he is basically correct.
It will be remembered that Aquinas's theory of natural law involved a
definition of law in general. Law, for him, was "something pertaining to
reason," it was "a rational ordering of things," it was "a rule or measure
of action in virtue of which one is led to perform certain actions and re-
strained from the performance of others." Ockham, however, substituted
a different theory of natural law, and it is clear that the change must necessi-
tate also a different definition of law in general. I am, alas, unable to cite
relevant texts from Ockham himself, but perhaps the words of Pierre d'Ailly,
one of his more faithful philosophical disciples, will suffice. For d'A'illy
regards obligation as the distinguishing mark of law and argues, therefore,
that a law must take the form of precept or prohibition, of the command to
do something or not to do it.4 6 He agrees that custom is said, with the lapse
of time, to have the force of law, but insists that it carries no weight, even
against human positive law which can abrogate it.4 7 He can conclude, there-
fore, that it is legitimate to apply to the pope the Roman legal maxim that
"the Prince is bound by no law" - not even those laws which he himself
has made - so long as it is remembered that this refers to human and not to
divine law.48 For "just as the divine will," he says, "is the first efficient cause
in the genus of efficient causality, so also is it the first obligating rule or law
45. STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY 31-32 (New York, 1958).
46. Utrum Petri Ecclesia, in J. GERSON, OPERA OmNum, ed. Ellies du Pin (Antwerp,
1706), I, col. 663: ". . . lex divina sumitur pro lege divinitus inspirata: qualis est lex
Moysis, vel Christi. Uno modo, potest sumi pro aliqua una regula data a Deo aliquid
pr-ecipiente, vel probibente. Alio modo, pro aliqua una congregatione plures tales regulas
continente: qualiter tota doctrina Christi dicitur lex Christi.... Sed sic capiendo, potest
sumi stricte, pro aliqua tali congregatione solum continente prmcepta et prohibitiones;
quia haec duo solum pertinent ad legern proprie dictam."
47. See Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate, in GERsoN, II, col. 933; Tractatus II adversus
Cancellarium Parisiensem, in GERSON, I, col. 773.
48. Tractatus de materia conciii generalis; Paris, BibL. Nat., Ms. Lat. 1480, fol. 108r:
".. Et hoc ideo dicit quia princeps legibus solutus est, ut in dicto cap. Signifcasti.
... Sed quod dicit hic glossa quod princeps est solutus legibus, intelligit haec opinio de
legibus hUmani ab ipso editis. De legibus autem divinis ... non concedit."
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in the genus of obligating law," 49 and "no edict of a prince, precept of a
prelate, political statute or ecclesiastical decree is just or justly obligatory,
unless it is in conformity with the divine law." 50
Perhaps the most interesting thing about this is that these words could
almost equally well be attributed to Bodin, the self-styled father of the notion
of sovereignty. Nor should this be surprising. For in their legal voluntarism
or positivism the nominalist philosophers joined hands with the Roman law-
yers51 - in particular, with the school of the Post-Glossators, the most famous
of whom were Bartolus and his pupil Baldus, 52 and among the descendants
of whom Bodin was proud to count himself. 53 And this is not merely to say
that the nominalists adopted legal views parallel to those of the Post-Glossa-
tors, but, further, that they actually exerted an influence upon them.
It is admittedly difficult to establish the probability of such an influence,
but it is not impossible. If, for instance, we turn our attention to the England
of the early seventeenth century (on the face of it, as the home of the com-
mon law, unpromising ground), we find that the issue was being joined
between royal claims to absolutism and parliamentary claims to a greater
control over the government of the country. One of the crucial areas in this
constitutional struggle was, of course, the extent of the king's prerogative
powers in matters of taxation, and, in 1606, this led to a famous legal decision
in the case known as Bate's case. The details of this case do not concern us
here, but Holdsworth has described the decision of the Chief Justice (or,
rather, the Chief Baron) as the first clear statement of the new royalist theory
that the king had "an overriding absolute prerogative to deal with matters
of State," or "a general absolute prerogative to act as he pleased, which he
could use whenever he saw fit." 54 The case is clearly an important one, and
the wording of the Chief Baron's decision is highly significant. "The King's
power," he says,
is double, ordinary and absolute, and they have several laws and ends.
49. QUARSTIONES SUPER I, III ET IV SENTENTIARUM (Lyons, 1500), I, qu. 14, art. 3,
Q, f. 173r: ". . . sicut voluntas divina in genere efficientis est prima efficiens causa, sic
ipsa in genere legis obligantis est prima lex seu regula obligatoria."
50. Princ. in lum Sent., E, f. 21v: "Ex quo sequitur quod nullurn principis edictum,
prmlati pr'ceptum, politice statutum aut Ecclesia decreturn est justum vel juste obliga-
torium, nisi sit divim legi consonum."
51. Cf. R. W. and A. J. CARLYLE, 6 A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY 419
(Edinburgh and London, 1936).
52. Bartolus was born in 1314 and died c. 1357-see C.N.S. WOOLF, BARTOLUS OF
SASSOFERATO (Cambridge, 1913). The Post-Glossators were often known as Bartolists.
For a bibliographical sketch on Baldus (1314-1400), see J. D. Wilson, Balus de Ubaldis,
12 YALE LAW JOURNAL 8-20 (1902).
53. See H. D. Hazeltine, Introduction to WALTER ULLMANN, THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF
LAW XXV (London, 1946).
54. W. S. HOLDSWORTH, 6 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 21 (London, 1924).
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That of the ordinary is for the profit of particular subjects, for the execu-
tion of civil justice, the determining of meum . . . and by the civilians
is nominated jus privatum and with us common law; and these laws
cannot be changed without parliament .... The absolute power of the
King is not that which is converted or executed to private use, to the benefit
of any particular person, but is only that which is applied to the general
benefit of the people, and is salus populi; as the people is the body and
the King is the head... and as the constitution of this body varieth with
the time, so varieth this absolute law according to the wisdom of the
King, for the common good.55
If this were not an English case, and if we were not, perhaps understand-
ably, a little skeptical about the impact of theological modes of thought upon
legal matters, this distinction between the absolute and the ordinary powers of
the king might look suspiciously analogous to the nominalist distinction be-
tween the absolute and the ordinary powers of God. It is certainly a new
distinction in English law, and Holdsworth can only suggest as its origin a
somewhat similar distinction used in the fifteenth century to elucidate "the
difference between the common law administered in the common law courts
and the equity administered in the Chancery."' 5 6 But what Holdsworth
overlooked was this: that in 1605, only a year before Bate's case, Albericus
Gentilis, the Italian jurist who taught Civil Law at Oxford and who is usually
classed as a Bartolist or Post-Glossator,5 7 had clearly enunciated this same
distinction between the absolute and the ordinary powers of the prince, saying
that the absolute power (which in England is called the prerogative) is the
very plenitude of power, and, unlike the ordinary, is subject to no law. 58
More significantly, in making this distinction, Albericus had referred back
for his authority to the fourteenth century Post-Glossator, Baldus. Now Baldus
was a contemporary of Ockham.5 0
Those who are convinced that theology has little influence on anything
- even religion - will no doubt be disposed to dismiss as an interesting
coincidence the striking analogy which exists between the distinctions em-
ployed by these two contemporaries in their respective fields of theology and
law. To these, the skeptical, I would suggest three considerations. In the
first place, law has not always been as divorced from theology as it is today,
55. T. B. and T. J. HOWELL (ed.), A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, II,
col. 389 (London, 1816).
56. 2 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 597 (London, 1923). An echo of this usage is to be
heard in SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTHE PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND ch. 8, p. 79 (London, 1797).
57. Hazeltine, op. cit. supra note 53, at xxv.
58. Regales Disputationes Tres, Disp. Prima, p. 10; the relevant text is cited in CARLYLE,
6 A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY 452, n. 2.
59. Ockham was born c. 1288 and died c. 1350.
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and the Post-Glossators, in particular, are known to have drawn upon scholas-
tic ideas concerning government, law, and justice.60 In the second place, if
the gulf between theology and law still seems too wide to justify the trans-
ference of ideas from one to the other, perhaps the canon law might be re-
garded as a possible intermediary, and, in fact, it is true that in at least one
canonical treatise, this same distinction is known to have been made between
the absolute and the ordinary powers - in this case, of course, of the pope.6 1
In the third place, and a little closer to home, in 1610 - four years after
Bate's case - the analogy was explicitly drawn, and by no less a person than
James I himself in a speech delivered to Parliament.62 In this speech, James
insisted that the king is accountable for his actions to God alone, and argued
that "if you will consider the attributes of God you will see how they agree
in the person of a king." For just as God has the power to create or destroy,
so also kings have the power to make and unmake their subjects, to exalt
the low and abase the high, and, in his own memorable phrase, to "make
of their subjects like men at the chess." And, having said this, he adds the
following comment:
But now in these our times we are to distinguish between the state of
kings in their first original and between the state of settled kings and mon-
archs that do at this time govern in civil kingdoms; for even as God,
during the time of the Old Testament, spake by oracles and wrought by
miracles, yet how soon it pleased him to settle a Church ... then there
was a cessation of both. He ever afterwards governing His people and
Church within the limits of His revealed will. So in the first original of
kings, whereof some had their beginnings by conquest and some by elec-
tion of the people, their wills at that time served for law; yet how soon
kingdoms began to be settled in civility and policy, then did kings set
down their minds by laws, which are properly made by the king only,
but at the rogation of the people, the king's grant being obtained there-
unto.
Historians have usually been impatient of James' frequent theological
similes and have tended to regard them as merely the sugar coating designed
to render the swallowing of the pill of prerogative a little less distasteful. But
may I suggest that in so doing they have been adopting an anachronistic
attitude towards statements which were intended in a serious and literal sense,
and which are historically valuable as indications of the ultimate theological
60. Cf. Hazeltine, op. cit. supra note 53, at xxii.
61. See H. JEDIN, A HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT, trans. E. Graf (St. Louis,
1957), p. 81, where he cites the Tractatus alter de cardinalibus (ca. 1448-1451) to this
effect.
62. C. H. MCILWAIN, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES I 307-310 (Cambridge, 1918).
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origin of some of the modes of thought characteristic, not only of the king
himself, or of his prerogative lawyers, but also of that whole juristic school,
the most famous representative of which was Bodin?
IV
Those to whom this type of historical approach does not recommend
itself may be inclined to dismiss reflections such as these as possibly of interest
to the professional archaeologist of ideas but certainly of no wider relevance.
To these I would, in conclusion and very tentatively, suggest the possibility
of an alternative and perhaps less purely historical approach, an approach
moving by way of the philosophical presuppositions which lay behind the
legal views of Aquinas and Ockham. And what characterizes this approach
is the belief that, as Oakeshott has said, there has probably been
no theory of the nature of the world, of the activity of man, of the destiny
of mankind, no theology or cosmology, perhaps even no metaphysics, that
has not sought a reflection of itself in the mirror of political philosophy.6 3
- and therefore, we may add, of legal theory.
R. G. Collingwood has argued that "in the history of European thought
there have been three periods of constructive cosmological thinking," by which
he means three periods
when the idea of nature has come into the focus of thought, become the
subject of intense and protracted reflection, and consequently acquired
new characteristics which in their turn have given a new aspect to the
detailed science of nature that has been based upon it.64
The three ideas of nature which these periods have produced he calls the
Greek, the "Renaissance," 6 5 and the modern. The contrast between these
ideas springs, he suggests, from the difference between their analogical ap-
proach to nature. The modern idea does not concern us here - suffice it to
say that he regards it as based upon the analogy between the processes of the
natural world as studied by natural scientists and the vicissitudes of human
63. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT (ed), THE LEVIATHAN OF THOMAS HOSSES, Introduction
xix (Oxford, 1946).
64. IDEA OF NATURE I (Oxford, 1945).
65. As Collingwood himself admits (p. 4), "The name is not a good one, because the
word 'Renaissance' is applied to an earlier phase in the history of thought, beginning
in Italy with the humanism of the fourteenth century and continuing, in the same country,
with the Platonic and Aristotelian cosmologies of that century and the fifteenth century.
The cosmology I have now to describe was in principle a reaction against these and might,
perhaps, be more accurately called post-Renaissance."
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affairs as studied by historians. Turning to the two earlier "ideas," he argues
that whereas the Greek view of nature as an intelligent organism was based
on an analogy between the world of nature and the individual human being,
the "Renaissance" view conceived the world analogically as a machine. In-
stead of being regarded as capable of ordering its own movements in a rational
manner and according to its immanent laws, the movements which it exhibits
are imposed from without, and "their regularity... due to 'laws of nature'
likewise imposed from without." 66 Collingwood concludes, therefore, that
this view presupposes both the human experience of designing and con-
structing machines, and the Christian idea of a creative and omnipotent God.
This is, I believe, a good way of characterizing the change in approach which
led to the development of the classical or Newtonian physical science. And
it is relevant to our problem, as we shall see, because it indicates the role
played in this development both by the Christian idea of an omnipotent God
and by the concomitant idea of the imposed laws of nature.
But what reflection do these cosmologies find in the "mirror of political
philosophy"? The answer to this question, I would suggest, is to be found
in the three main patterns which, Oakeshott has claimed, "philosophical re-
flection about politics has impressed upon the intellectual history of Europe."
The first of these patterns or traditions, he tells us,
is distinguished by the master-conceptions of Reason and Nature. It is
coeval with our civilization; it has an unbroken history into the modem
world; and it has survived by a matchless power of adaptability all the
changes of the European consciousness. The master-conceptions of the
second are Will and Artifice. It too springs from the soil of Greece, and
has drawn inspiration from many sources, not least from Israel and
Islam. The third tradition is of later birth, not appearing until the
eighteenth century. The cosmology it reflects on its still unsettled surface
is the world seen on the analogy of human history.67
The coincidence of these traditions of political thought with Collingwood's
"ideas of nature" is apparent and striking -the more so, indeed, in that
they were formulated, not only independently of these ideas of nature, but
also with an eye rather to the history of theories of knowledge than to the
history of cosmological assumptions.68 And the actual link between these
traditions of political thought and the ideas of nature which correspond to
them is to be found, I would further suggest, in the ideas of law which they
share in common.
66. Op. cit. supra note 64, at 6.
67. Op. cit. supra note 63, at xii.
68. I owe this information to Professor Oakeshott in a private letter.
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A. N. Whitehead, who, before Collingwood, had stressed the relevance
of the Semitic concept of God to the development of the natural sciences in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,69 distinguished between the two
salient types of natural law which we have already seen related to Coiling-
wood's Greek and "Renaissance" cosmologies. It is true that Whitehead, too,
was concerned with analyzing cosmological assumptions, but the distinction
is as valid and relevant in the juridical sphere as it is in the scientific. 70 It
merits, therefore, closer consideration.
The theory of law as immanent, he argued, involves the assumption that
things are interdependent in such a way that when we know the nature of
things we also know their mutual relations with one another. "Some partial
identity of pattern in the various characters of natural things issues in some
partial identity of pattern in the mutual relations of these things." The laws
of nature are the formulation of these identities of pattern. Thus it could be
adduced as a law of nature that animals unite to produce offspring or that
stones released in midair strive to reach the ground. This view of the laws
of nature involves, he concluded, "some doctrine of Internal Relations,"
some notion that the characters of things are the outcome of their intercon-
nections, and the interconnections of things the outcome of their characters"
- and, we may add, it involves, therefore, a wholehearted subscription to an
unambiguously Realist ontology.
The doctrine of imposed law, on the other hand, adopts the alternative
metaphysical theory of external relations. Individual existents are regarded
as the ultimate constituents of nature; and these ultimate constituents are
conceived to possess no inherent connections one with another, but to be com-
prehensible each in complete isolation from the rest. The relations into which
they enter are imposed on them from without, and these imposed behavior
patterns are the laws of nature. It follows, therefore, that these laws cannot
be discovered by a scrutiny of the characters of the related things, nor, con-
versely, can the nature of the related things be deduced from the laws gov-
erning their relations. It follows also, we may add, that such a view pre-
supposes a nominalist epistemology and entails an empiricist science of nature.
With this distinction in mind it is revealing to glance back to the ideas
of natural law and the laws of nature held in the centuries before Ockham.
Immanent law is found to be typified by Stoic, perhaps even generally by
Greek, views. These conceived of the material world as impregnated with
reason, and regarded natural law as universally valid and inherent in the
69. SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 12-14 (New York, 1948).
70. ADVENTURES OF IDEAS' 115-119 (New York, 1955). For an interesting attempt to
apply the distinction to the juridical sphere see M. Ginsberg, The Concept of Juridical
and Scientific Law, 4 POLrrICA 1 ff. (1936).
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very structure of things - so much so, indeed, that the Stoics could draw
arguments for peace from the harmony of the celestial spheres. Imposed law,
on the other hand, finds its best illustration in Semitic, and, in particular, in
Jewish monotheism. For the God of the Old Testament gave to Moses the
Ten Commandments, and "to the sea his law, that the waters should not pass
his commandment." 71
And the Christian view? Whitehead's comment was that it was a com-
promise between the immanence of law and imposed law due to the Pla-
tonism of Christianity. 7 2 In this, as in so many other matters, it reflects an
amalgamation of Semitic and Hellenic elements. This somewhat uneasy com-
promise is evident in Aquinas. His God is, admittedly, a Christian God, om-
nipotent and transcendent, but his eternal law is undoubtedly immanent in the
universe. Thus although God is not thought of as being immanent in the
world, it should be noted that the eternal law finds its ultimate foundation in
the intellect, and, therefore, in the very being of God, so that Aquinas can
at one point say that the eternal law is nothing other than God. 7 3
This quasi-immanentism involved an attempted Christianization of the
Platonic doctrine of Eternal Forms or Ideas by means of the location of these
Ideas in the divine mind as exemplars according to which God created the
world, and it was hedged around with cautious qualifications. These quali-
fications, however, were clearly not cautious enough, and, in 1277, the bishop
of Paris and the archbishop of Canterbury condemned a whole host of phil-
osophical propositions, several of them Thomistic, as contrary to Christian
beliefs. 74 In so acting, they followed in the footsteps of the Arab and Jewish
theologians, who, before them had resorted to similar measures, and they
reflected a fear, widespread among theologians of all three religions, that
the metaphysical necessitarianism of Aristotle endangered the doctrine, com-
mon to Jews, Moslems, and Christians, of the freedom and omnipotence of
God.
The condemnations marked the beginning of a theological reaction that
was to vindicate the freedom and omnipotence of God at the expense of the
ultimate intelligibility of the world, 75 and Ockham - a philosopher so often
71. Proverbs 8:29.
72. ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 139-140.
73. S. T., Ia 2ae, qu. 91, art. 1 ad tertium.
74. Etienne Gilson points out that the doctrinal act of 1277 traced the condemned errors
to their very root, "namely, the Aristotelian identification of reality, intelligibility and
necessity, not only in things, but first and above all in God." HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN
PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AoEs 407 (New York, 1955). See also pp. 728-729, where
he lists some of the condemned propositions. One of them is: "That God necessarily
produces what immediately follows from him."
75. This amounted to an abandonment of any attempt to reconcile the Greek conception
of a necessarily existing universe, ruled by strict necessity, with the Biblical notion of a
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regarded as comparable with Hume- was the classic product of this reac-
tion. Gilson has spoken of his thought as being a post-1277 theology "in
a more than chronological sense," 76 and as being dominated "by the first
words of the Christian creed: I believe in one God, the Father Almighty." 77
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Ockham should have rejected the doc-
trine of the divine ideas, not only as introducing a heathen multiplicity into
the Christian God, but also as implying a qualification of the divine omnipo-
tence and freedom. Nor is it surprising that he should have viewed the divine
liberty as similarly compromised by the realist connection of the natural moral
law with the doctrine of the divine ideas, for the moral law, just as the whole
of creation, must, he insisted, be utterly contingent upon the unhampered
fiat of the divine will. And, believing this, he had no choice but to dismiss
the traditional doctrine of the divine ideas, and the whole metaphysic of
essences upon which it depended, as a pagan interpolation that had no place
in any Christian philosophy.
Ockham's universe, therefore, is one in which a free and omnipotent God
boldly confronts, without any necessary intermediaries, the things which he
has created and which are radically contingent upon him. Hence, the dis-
missal of any necessary connections in nature between distinct things, even
between cause and effect.78 Hence, too, the belief that if we are to know the
order of the world we can only examine what is de facto, for being completely
dependent on the divine choice, it cannot be deduced by any a priori argu-
ments. 79 Thus, from Ockham's fundamental insistence on the omnipotence
and freedom of God follow, not only his nominalism, not only his ethical or
legal voluntarism, but also his empiricism.
Now the lesson to be drawn from all this is that in a coherent philosophical
system, given any one of the following elements, we should expect to find
freely created world, ruled by a free and omnipotent divine will. The Arab theologians
had already faced the same problem and had adopted a comparable solution. Al Ash'ari
(d. 936) and his followers vindicated the Semitic notion of God by adopting an atomistic
view of the world as constituted of disjointed moments of time and points of space, con-
nected together only by the will of God and possessing, therefore, no natural necessity.
They held to this position so strictly that they were driven into a thoroughgoing occa-
sionalism. See L. Gardet and M-M Anawati, Introduction t la thdologie musulmane, 37
ETUDES DE PHIL. mfiD. 52-66 (Paris, 1948). This viewpoint was also adopted by early
Jewish thinkers. See ERNEST RENAN, AvEanois ET L'AvRROISME 106 (Paris, 1861), and
IsAAc HUSIK, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY Xli (New York, 1958).
76. Op. cit. supra note 74, at 410.
77. Id. at 498.
78. Thus God can produce, in us intuitions of nonexistent objections - QUODLIBETA
SEPTEM UNA CUM TRACTATU DE SACRAMENTO ALTARIS (Strasbourg, 1491), Quodl. VI, qu.
6; English translation of this question in RICHARD McKEON, 2 SELECTIONS FROM
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHERS 372-375 (New York, 1930).
79. Cf. L. BAUDRY, LE TRACTATUS DE PRINCIPUS THEOLOGIAB ATTRIBUA I G. D"OcCAM
Introduction 23 (Paris, 1936).
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in conjunction with it the rest -a nominalist epistemology; an empiricist
approach to natural science; and, if a conception of God is admitted, a volun-
tarist or imposed version of the natural law (both scientific and juridical)
and a Semitic view of God which stresses above all his utter freedom and
omnipotence. But, as we have seen, the voluntarist interpretation of the
natural law tends to carry over into a positivist interpretation of law in gen-
eral. In a very tentative way, therefore, I would proffer the general conclu-
sion that the shift to the metaphysical presuppositions necessary for the de-
velopment of an empirical or quasi-empirical natural science did much to
encourage the growth of a full-blown legal positivism. This is very clear in
a philosopher like d'Ailly, a man whose thinking embodies all the elements
which we have linked together, who propounded a positivist theory of law
in general, and, therefore, a voluntarist theory of natural law and of the laws
of nature, and who made use of expressions such as "the machine of the
universe," 80 admitting the relevance to the world of the very dock analogy
that was to become a clich6 of eighteenth century deist theology.81 For just
as the craftsman constructs a clock, so also, in an analogical way, God -
whom he calls, consistently enough, "the supreme architect and artisan" -
can be said to fashion the celestial machine. 82 Admittedly, if we turn to the
famous architects of the seventeenth century scientific revolution, men such
as Robert Boyle and Sir Isaac Newton, while we do find that they incline
to nominalism and empiricism and tend to view the laws of nature as imposed
upon a mechanistic world by a God whose most striking attribute is his om-
nipotence, we also find that they were uninterested in matters juridical. The
influence, however, of their type of thinking cannot lightly be dismissed, and
there is one seventeenth century figure in whose thinking most of our requisite
elements explicitly - and all of them implicitly - play their role. This man
is the more important in that he occupies an admitted, indeed, a prominent
place in the history of legal positivism. His name is Thomas Hobbes.
80. YMAGO MuND , ed. E. Buron, 3 vols. (Paris, 1930), II, p. 494.
81. Tractatus de Legibus et Sectis, in J. GERSON, OPERA OMNIA, ed. Ellies du Pin (Ant-
werp, 1706), I, col. 793: ". . . Et confirmatur ratio: quis si quis faceret horologium
materiale, utique efficeret omnes rotas, motusque earum commensurabiles, quantum posset:
quanto magis ergo opinandum est de architectore surnmoque opifice Deo, qui omnia fecisse
dicitur numero, pondere et mensura."
82. Ibid.
